Classical Realism Redux: How the US Used Machiavellian Energy Strategy in Venezuela and Iran

Classical Realism: Seizing the “Center of Gravity”

Last week, PRS’ Risk Governance group looked at the strategic orchestration of the Venezuela-Iran campaign in a way that went beyond modern foreign policy terminology to classical political and military theory. 

 It was a very lively discussion and a summary of the talks – and the references to political theorists – is below.

First, it appears the sequence of events underscores that taking control of Venezuelan crude was part of a coordinated, global energy strategy. The US military executed a rapid intervention in Caracas to remove Nicolás Maduro in January 2026. Almost immediately, Washington took control of existing oil stocks and began pushing for deep integration with American energy corporations. Just weeks later, in February 2026, the U.S. initiated major military strikes against Iran.

The argument was that the January operation in Venezuela was a preemptive move to secure a strategic cushion for the global market before launching the February strikes against Tehran. By neutralizing Maduro—a close ally of Iran—and anchoring a US foothold over Venezuela’s oil fields, Washington insulated itself from the likely economic fallout of a Middle Eastern war.

Thucydides and the Necessity of Hegemonic Security

In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides famously observed that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” He argued that state behavior is driven by a triad of motives: honor, fear, and interest.

The US intervention in Caracas was driven entirely by a realist fear of an unhedged energy crisis and the preservation of vital interests. Facing an ongoing conflict with Iran that threatened the Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly 20% of the world’s petroleum passes—the US could not leave its economy vulnerable to a catastrophic price spike. Securing the Venezuelan oilfields closer to home was a structural necessity to ensure survival in a multi-theater conflict.

Sun Tzu and the Art of Compulsion

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War dictates that the highest art of warfare is to subdue the enemy without fighting—or, failing that, to shape the battlefield so that the enemy is defeated before kinetic engagement even begins. Sun Tzu writes: “In war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.”

By striking Maduro’s economically fragile regime in January, Washington severed a critical nodule of the “Axis of Evasion” (the alliance between Tehran, Caracas, Moscow, and Beijing). Sun Tzu also emphasized cutting off the enemy’s provisions. Neutralizing Iran’s primary economic partner in the Western Hemisphere effectively starved Tehran of alternative diplomatic and financial lifelines before US forces engaged them directly in February.

Machiavelli and the Strategic Use of Force

In The Prince, Niccolò Machiavelli asserted that a ruler must possess the foresight to diagnose political ills before they become incurable. He noted that “war cannot be avoided, but only deferred to the advantage of others.”

The Trump administration operated on pure Machiavellian pragmatism. Recognizing that a military confrontation with Iran was highly likely, Washington chose not to defer the conflict until a time when global oil supplies were tightly constrained. Instead, they actively reshaped the geopolitical landscape, taking control of the oilfields to absorb the shockwaves of the upcoming war. The 100-year concession secured by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is a textbook execution of Machiavellian statecraft: securing long-term economic dominance under the umbrella of immediate military necessity.

Quantitative Risk Indicators: The Predictive ICRG Framework

This dramatic geopolitical shift did not happen in a vacuum. It was preceded by clear, measurable declines in structural stability. Using ICRG methodology, our analysts were able to map out exactly which metrics served as leading indicators for this intervention.

For Government Stability, scores were critically low under Maduro due to extreme institutional decay and parallel governance. A severely depressed score in this metric acts as a flashing red light for external intervention or irregular regime change. Following the deal, this metric is stabilizing under Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government, heavily backstopped by US security guarantees.

The Investment Profile metric was near-zero prior to the intervention due to expropriations, severe debt defaults, and sweeping US sanctions. A prolonged low score (high risk) signals that the existing system is untenable, making a forced systemic reset highly probable. Currently, the profile is rebounding due to the $100 billion private capital injection and structural US legal protections.

Finally, External Conflict was marked as a high risk due to deep illicit networks and close alignments with US adversaries like Iran. High external risk scores indicated that Caracas was an active national security threat, justifying a preemptive strike. This is shifting significantly as Venezuela is forcefully realigned into the Western economic orbit.

Conclusion & Outlook

The dual campaigns in Venezuela and Iran demonstrate a return to raw, unapologetic realpolitik. By securing majority control over Venezuela’s energy reserves, Washington successfully built an energy buffer that defanged Iran’s primary economic deterrent—its ability to crash the global economy via the Strait of Hormuz. For global investors and risk managers, this environment highlights why tracking foundational institutional metrics is vital; when country risk profiles degrade past a point of no return, structural intervention is rarely far behind.

To review the complete underlying datasets, risk weightings, and historical country models utilized in this analysis, explore the full suite of methodology products at The PRS Group.

CHRISTOPHER MCKEE, PHD CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Christopher McKee is PRS’ CEO and Owner. An international political economist, global investor, entrepreneur, and author, Chris received his PhD from Queen’s University (Canada) and has been involved in the field of geopolitical risk, limited recourse financing, and private sector development for the past 25 years.